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BUYING THE ELECTORATE: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LANDSCAPE AND HOW THE SUPREME COURT 
ERRED IN NOT REVISITING CITIZENS UNITED 
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ABSTRACT 
The Article discusses how the Supreme Court erred by summarily reversing the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Western Tradition Partnership v. AG and not 
revisiting its holding in Citizens United v. FEC.  The Article begins by discussing 
the holding in the Western Tradition Partnership case and analyzing both the 
majority and dissenting opinions.  The Article then analyzes how the Montana 
Supreme Court distinguished Citizens United, with the Court specifically looking at 
the “unique” political history in Montana and finding that Montana’s ban on 
corporate independent political spending served a compelling state interest and was 
narrowly tailored to that interest.  
The Article then transitions into an empirical study of the current campaign 
finance landscape by specifically looking at states’ unique histories of corruption, 
the lack of transparency with regard to corporate political expenditures, the public 
perception of corruption in corporate political spending practices, the independence 
of super Political Action Committees (PACS), the influence of political dark money, 
and 501(c)(4) organizations and shell corporations being used to circumvent 
campaign finance disclosure rules and Federal tax laws.   
The Article concludes by listing additional arguments in favor of the Supreme 
Court revisiting Citizens United including the breadth of the First Amendment, the 
idea of corporations being “creatures of the state,” the ability of PACs to allow 
corporate political participation, the issue of a state’s power to exclude foreign 
corporations from participation in its democratic political institutions, shareholder 
protection, the treatment of public unions, and the Supreme Court’s long-standing 
history of altering constitutional doctrine when its understanding of the doctrine’s 
factual underpinnings no longer appear to be accurate.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“A petition for certiorari will give the Court an opportunity to consider whether, 
in light of the huge sums currently deployed to buy candidates' allegiance, Citizens 
United should continue to hold sway.”1 
The Article discusses how the Supreme Court erred by summarily reversing the 
Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Western Tradition Partnership v. AG2 and not 
revisiting its holding in Citizens United v. FEC.3  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                           
 1 Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).   
 2 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011). 
 3 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).   
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Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC)4 removed the prohibition on 
corporate independent political expenditures, and allows companies to spend 
unlimited sums from corporate treasuries to expressly advocate the election or defeat 
of a political candidate.5  The Citizens United decision effectively held that no 
“sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit 
or for-profit corporations.”6  The Citizens United decision not only struck down the 
Federal prohibition on independent political spending, it also effectively struck down 
laws in twenty-four states that had long banned or restricted independent corporate 
expenditures.7 
A recent case from the Montana Supreme Court, Western Tradition Partnership, 
Inc. v. AG,8 challenged that assertion and distinguished Citizens United by stating 
that “[Citizens United] considered the constitutionality of Federal statutes and 
regulations that prohibited corporations from ‘electioneering’ (making a 
communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office) within 
30 days of a primary election or 60 days of a general election,” and further stated 
that “Citizens United was a case decided upon its facts, and involved ‘unique and 
complex’ rules that affected . . . different types of speech in Federal elections.”9 
This Article is timely, especially since the Supreme Court recently granted 
certiorari and summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court in American 
Tradition Partnership v. Bullock.10  The Supreme Court held that “Montana’s 
arguments in support of the judgment [in Western Tradition Partnership] either were 
already rejected in Citizens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”11  
The Article discusses why the Supreme Court should not have summarily reversed 
the Montana Supreme Court’s decision   
                                                           
 4 Id.  The Court held that “that the Government may not suppress political speech on the 
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.  No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits 
on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”  Id. at 798-99.  It is important 
to note that the Citizens United decision did not alter the Congressional prohibitions on direct 
corporate or union contributions to candidates as upheld by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (per curiam).   
 5 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.  Independent Political Expenditures are defined 
as “an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or 
any authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, 
or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such 
candidate.”  2 U.S.C.A. § 431(17) (West 2013).   
 6 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.  
 7 See Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607#laws (last updated Jan. 4, 2011) (noting that 
while Citizens United did not directly strike down state laws, “[m]any of these states are 
looking at repealing or re-writing these laws to avoid legal challenges”). 
 8 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).   
 9 Id. at 6. 
 10 Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).   
 11 Id. 
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The Article begins by discussing the holding in the Western Tradition 
Partnership case and analyzing both the majority and dissenting opinions.  The 
Article then transitions into an empirical study of the current campaign finance 
landscape by specifically looking at: states’ unique histories of corruption, the lack 
of transparency with regard to corporate political expenditures, the public perception 
of corruption in corporate political spending practices, the independence of super 
PACs, the influence of political dark money, and 501(c)(4) organizations and shell 
corporations being used to circumvent campaign finance disclosure rules and Federal 
tax laws.   
The Article concludes by listing additional arguments in favor of the Supreme 
Court revisiting Citizens United including: the breadth of the First Amendment, the 
idea of corporations being “creatures of the state,” the ability of PACs to allow 
corporate political participation, the issue of a state’s power to exclude foreign 
corporations from participation in their democratic political institutions, shareholder 
protection, the treatment of public unions, and the Supreme Court’s long-standing 
history of altering constitutional doctrine when its understanding of the doctrine’s 
factual underpinnings no longer appear to be accurate.   
II.  WESTERN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP DECISION 
Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. (WTP),12 Champion Painting, Inc. (CPI),13 
and Montana Shooting Sports Foundation (MSSF)14 sued the Montana Attorney 
General, specifically seeking a declaration that Montana Code § 13-35-227(1) 
(Montana Statute) violated their freedom of speech protected by the United States 
and Montana Constitutions by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on 
behalf of or opposing candidates for public office.15   
The Montana Statute states that “[a] corporation may not make a contribution or 
an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports 
or opposes a candidate or a political party.”16  This section does not “prohibit the 
establishment or administration of a separate, segregated fund to be used for making 
political contributions or expenditures if the fund consists only of voluntary 
contributions solicited from an individual who is a shareholder, employee, or 
member of the corporation.”17   
                                                           
 12 WTP is an entity incorporated in Colorado in 2008 and registered to do business in 
Montana.  Western Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 4.  According to the Montana Supreme 
Court, “its purpose is to act as a conduit of funds for persons and entities including 
corporations who want to spend money anonymously to influence Montana elections.”  Id. 
 13 CPI is incorporated under the laws of Montana.  Id.  “It is a single proprietor painting 
and drywall business with no employees or members, and its sole shareholder is Kenneth 
Champion.”  Id. 
 14 “MSSF is a voluntary association of persons who support and promote firearm safety, 
shooting sports, education, shooting facilities and Second Amendment rights.”  Id.  It was 
incorporated in 1990.  Id.  “It has no employees or shareholders and its funding comes 
primarily from member dues and donations from other organizations.”  Id. 
 15 Id. at 3. 
 16 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011).  
 17 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(3) (2011).  These are known as political action 
committees or “PACs.” 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/7
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At the district court level, the court considered whether the Montana Statute 
violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to the extent that it restricted 
corporations from making independent corporate expenditures on behalf of 
candidates.18  The district court applied Citizens United, and determined that the 
Montana Statute impacted corporations’ political speech protected by the United 
States Constitution.19  The district court then considered whether the government had 
demonstrated a compelling interest for the restriction on speech, and whether the 
restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.20   
The district court answered both questions in the negative and held that “Citizens 
United is unequivocal: the government may not prohibit independent and indirect 
corporate expenditures on political speech.”21  The district court declared the statute 
unconstitutional and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs.22  The defendants 
appealed the district Court's order.  It is important to note that under Montana law, 
corporations are allowed to make independent expenditures on ballot issues.23  That 
issue was not challenged and, therefore, was not before the court.   
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Montana Supreme Court (Montana Court) stated that the lower district court 
“erroneously construed and applied the Citizens United case” and that “Citizens 
United was decided under its facts or lack of facts.”24  The Montana Court held that 
the U.S. Supreme Court (Supreme Court) had applied the rule that restrictions upon 
speech “are not per se unlawful, but rather may be upheld if the government 
demonstrates a sufficiently strong interest.”25  The Montana Court also held that the 
U.S. Supreme Court applied the highest level of scrutiny to the law restricting 
political speech, requiring the government to prove that the law furthers a 
compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to that interest, and that the “factual 
record before a court is critical to determining the validity of a governmental 
provision restricting speech.”26  The Montana Court emphasized that the case before 
                                                           
 18 See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., No. BDV-2010-238, 2010 Mont. Dist. 
LEXIS 412, at *1 (1st Dist. Mont. Oct. 18, 2010).     
 19 Id. at *9. 
 20 Id. at *13. 
 21 Id. at *18 (quoting Minn. Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868, 873 
(D. Minn. 2010)) 
 22 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 3. 
 23 Mont. Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 24 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 12, 13. 
 25 Id. at 6 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)). 
This test derives from the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 273-274 (1986); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 
81, 100 (1943). 
 26 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 6. 
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them was distinguishable from Citizens United because it concerned Montana law 
and political elections, and it arose from Montana history.27 
The first issue the Montana Court analyzed was the effect that the Montana 
Statute had on the political activity and speech of WTP, CPI, and MSSF.28  The 
Montana Court found that none of the organizations could demonstrate any way in 
which Montana law hindered or censored their political activity or speech.29  
Conversely, based upon affidavits and depositions submitted, all three organizations 
were actively involved in Montana politics.30   
MSSF contended that that even though Montana law allowed MSSF to obtain 
and spend donations from other organizations on political activities, it did not allow 
MSSF to use dues paid by its members for the same purpose.31  The Montana Court 
found that no such distinction appeared in Montana law and that MSSF failed to 
demonstrate that its speech was impaired by the statute.32  CPI’s owner, Kenneth 
Champion, contended that a candidate endorsement by CPI would be more 
persuasive than his personal endorsement.33  The Montana Court did not find this 
argument persuasive; the court stated that Champion is the sole shareholder of CPI 
and while Montana law forbids the expenditure of CPI’s corporate funds to support 
or oppose candidates, the burden upon Champion, as sole shareholder, to establish a 
PAC to advocate for CPI’s interests and expend funds were minimal.34  With regard 
to WTP, the Montana Court found that WTP was not a business corporation and was 
not forthcoming about its business practices.35  The Montana Court held that 
“[o]rganizations like WTP that act as conduits for anonymous spending by others 
represent a threat to the ‘political marketplace’” and that “[b]ecause WTP has not 
disclosed its operation, it is difficult to determine how it might be impacted by the 
Montana Statute, but given the evidence presented below we will assume there is a 
direct impact.”36 
The next issue the Montana Court analyzed was the regulatory burden imposed 
by the Montana Statute.  The court held that there was a “material factual distinction 
between the present case and Citizens United,” with regard to the regulatory burden 
imposed.37  In Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court found that PACs are 
“burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive 
                                                           
 27 Id.  This idea of Montana’s unique political history was a theme throughout the 
Montana Court’s decision.  Id.   
 28 Id. at 4. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 6. 
 31 Id. at 4. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 7. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/7
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regulations.”38  The U.S. Supreme Court further held that PACs have to comply with 
onerous regulations just to speak and that fewer than 2,000 corporations in the 
United States have PACs.39   
In Montana, the regulations governing the formation and maintenance of PACs 
can be found in Montana Code sections 13-37-201 and 13-35-402.40  The Montana 
Court found that unlike the federal rules for PACs, Montana law reflects that PACs 
can “be formed and maintained by filing simple and straight-forward forms or 
reports.”41  MSSF, by its own admission, had established its own PACs and used 
them to actively participate in the Montana political process.42  The Montana Court 
further found that the evidence submitted by the government demonstrated that 
corporations, through their PACs, have been active participants in Montana 
politics.43 
The next issue that the Montana Court analyzed was whether the law at issue 
could “be understood outside the context of the time and place it was enacted.”44  
The court described how at the time the Montana Statute was enacted, Montana 
political contests “were marked by rough contests for political and economic 
domination . . . between mining and industrial enterprises controlled by foreign 
trusts or corporations.”45  The Montana Court discussed fights for mineral rights 
between companies and corruption throughout the Montana political system in the 
early twentieth century.46   
The Montana Court focused on the story of W. A. Clark, who had amassed a 
fortune from industrial operations in Montana.47  In 1899, the Montana Legislature 
elected Clark to the U.S. Senate.  However, subsequent to his election, Clark 
admitted to spending $272,000 dollars in the effort and the estimated expense was 
over $400,000 dollars.48  Complaints of Clark's bribery of the Montana Legislature 
led to an investigation by the U.S. Senate in 1900.  The Senate investigating 
committee “concluded that Clark had won his seat through bribery and unseated him.  
The Senate committee ‘expressed horror at the amount of money which had been 
poured into politics in Montana elections . . . and expressed its concern with respect 
to the general aura of corruption in Montana.’”49  Clark testified in the U.S. Senate 
                                                           
 38 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).    
 39 Id. (citing Brief for Seven Former Chairmen of Fed. Election Comm’n et al., as Amici 
Curiae 11). 
 40 Western Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 7. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 8. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 8-9. 
 47 Id. at 8.   
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. (citing K. ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA, AN UNCOMMON LAND 186-94 (1959)). 
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that “‘[m]any people [had] become so indifferent to voting’ in Montana as a result of 
the ‘large sums of money that [had] been expended in the state.’”50 
The Montana Court also relied upon an affidavit from history professor Dr. Harry 
Fritz.  Dr. Fritz reported that the “‘dangers of corporate influence remain in 
Montana’ because the resources upon which its economy depends in turn depend 
upon distant markets.  He affirmed: ‘What was true a century ago is as true today: 
distant corporate interests mean that corporate dominated campaigns will only work 
in the essential interest of outsiders with local interests a very secondary 
consideration.’”51  Bob Brown, a former long-time Montana legislator, submitted an 
affidavit attesting that “Montana politics are more susceptible to corruption than 
Federal campaigns, and that infusions of large amounts of corporate independent 
expenditure on just media coverage ‘could accomplish the same type of corruption 
of Montana politics as that which led to the enactment of’ [the Montana Statute].”52  
Edwin Bender, Executive Director of the National Institute on Money in State 
Politics, affirmed that “the low cost of political races in Montana, in comparison to 
other states,” makes it possible for direct political spending by corporations to 
significantly affect the outcome of elections.53 
The Montana Court found that based upon the history of the Montana Statute, 
Montana citizens had a compelling interest to enact the challenged statute in 1912.54  
The court questioned if or when did Montana lose the power or interest sufficient to 
support the Montana Statute.55  The court used a clever analogy by asking whether a 
state would “have to repeal or invalidate its murder prohibition if the homicide rate 
decline[d]?”56   
The Montana Court also found that “[w]hile Montana has a clear interest in 
preserving the integrity of its electoral process, it also has an interest in encouraging 
the full participation of the Montana electorate.”57  The court discussed the affidavit 
submitted by Edwin Bender which “demonstrate[d] that individual voter 
contributions are diminished from 48 percent of the total raised by candidates in 
states where a corporate spending ban has been in place to 23 percent of the total 
raised by candidates in states that permit unlimited corporate spending.”58  Based 
upon this evidence, the Montana Court found that “the impact of unlimited corporate 
donations creates a dominating impact on the political process and inevitably 
minimizes the impact of individual citizens.”59 
                                                           
 50 Id. at 7 (citing K. ROSS TOOLE, MONTANA, AN UNCOMMON LAND 184-85 (1959)). 
 51 Id. at 9. 
 52 Id. at 10. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 11. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 12. 
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The Montana Court concluded that the Montana Statute was constitutional 
because it demonstrated a compelling interest for the restriction on speech, and the 
restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.60  The court held that 
“Citizens United does not compel a conclusion that Montana's law prohibiting 
independent political expenditures by a corporation related to a candidate is 
unconstitutional.  Rather, applying the principles enunciated in Citizens United, it is 
clear that Montana has a compelling interest to impose the challenged rationally-
tailored statutory restrictions.”61 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent argued that corporations have broad rights under the First 
Amendment and even though the Montana Attorney General identified compelling 
reasons for limiting corporate expenditures, the Supreme Court, in Citizens United, 
had already rebuffed each reason.62  It is interesting to note that in the dissent, Justice 
Nelson went to great lengths to show that he disagreed with the rationale used in 
Citizens United, but believed that the Montana Court was bound to enforce the 
Supreme Court’s decision.63 
The dissent briefly discussed the Citizens United decision and provided a detailed 
comparison of the rationales provided by the majority and the Supreme Court.  First, 
the dissent discussed the majority’s argument that PACs in Montana are easy to 
create and maintain.64  The Supreme Court in Citizens United rejected PACs, in part, 
because they were subject to burdensome and expensive start-up costs and filing fees 
under Federal regulations.65  However, the dissent noted that the Supreme Court 
specifically stated that “[a] PAC is a separate association from the corporation.  So 
the PAC exemption from the [law’s] expenditure ban does not allow corporations to 
speak.”66  The dissent contended that even though PACs are easier to create and 
maintain under Montana law, the Supreme Court explicitly found that PACs were 
separate entities and could not speak for the corporation.67 
Second, the dissent discussed the majority’s anti-corruption rationale.68  The 
dissent discussed the majority’s view of corporate domination and corrupt influence 
throughout the history of Montana politics.69  The dissent found this argument 
unpersuasive and argued that “The [U.S.] Supreme Court unequivocally repudiated 
                                                           
 60 Id. at 13. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 14 (Nelson, J., dissenting).   
 63 Id. at 18 (“I agree, at least in principle, with much of the Court’s discussion and with the 
arguments of the Attorney General.”).   
 64 Id. at 88. 
 65 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).   
 66 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 21 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 897).   
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 89. 
 69 Id. at 90. 
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the notion that corporate political speech can be restricted ‘as a means to prevent 
corporations from obtaining an unfair advantage in the political marketplace by 
using resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’”70  The dissent also argued 
that the U.S. Supreme Court specifically found that “independent expenditures, 
including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption” and that a “sufficiently important governmental interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption . . . was limited to quid pro 
quo corruption.”71 
The dissent also rejected the majority’s argument that Citizens United was 
decided upon a “unique” set of facts and only applied to federal elections.  The 
dissent stated that “Bellotti72 did not address the constitutionality of the State’s ban 
on corporate independent expenditures to support candidates.  In our view, however, 
that restriction would have been unconstitutional.”73  The dissent argued that this 
language reflects that the prohibition on corporate independent political expenditures 
would not pass constitutional muster, regardless of whether it is a federal or state 
law.74 
Third, the dissent discussed the majority’s citizen protection (anti-distortion) 
rationale.  The dissent discussed the majority’s view that allowing corporations to 
spend an unlimited amount of money in Montana political elections would leave 
average citizens unable to complete and would create the perception that their 
support did not matter.75  The dissent found this argument unpersuasive and stated 
that “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our 
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.”76  The dissent further stated that “[t]he rule that political speech 
cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the 
premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political 
speech based on the speaker’s identity.”77  Based upon these statements, the dissent 
found the majority’s anti-distortion theory to be invalid under Citizens United.78   
Fourth, the dissent discussed the majority’s interest in protecting its system of 
elected judges.  The dissent discussed the majority’s view that Montana judicial 
elections were particularly vulnerable to large levels of corporate spending and 
would affect the public’s perception of judicial impartiality.79  The dissent argued 
that the majority’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. 
                                                           
 70 Id. at 27-28 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904). 
 71 Id. at 28 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909). 
 72 First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).   
 73 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 28 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. at 903). 
 74 Id. at 33 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 75 Id. at 35 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 76 Id. at 22 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904).   
 77 Id. at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905).   
 78 Id. at 29-30 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
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Massey Coal80 was misguided.  The dissent stated that “Caperton held that a judge 
was required to recuse himself ‘when a person with a personal stake in a particular 
case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case 
by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was 
pending or imminent.’”81  The dissent further argued that the Supreme Court stated 
in Citizens United that “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge 
must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be banned” and that 
recusal was the remedy for protecting the due process rights of litigants, not banning 
corporate speech.82  The dissent also relied on the Supreme Court’s rationale in 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,83 which stated that “the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s canon of judicial conduct (the “announce clause”) prohibiting candidates for 
judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues 
violated the First Amendment.”84   
The dissent concluded by stating that the majority was misguided in its attempt to 
craft a theory of Montana being a unique situation and Citizens United only applying 
to federal elections.85  The dissent found that the Montana Statute was facially 
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United.86 
III.  WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED 
It is instructive to look at the Montana Court’s holding in Western Tradition 
Partnership and see how they distinguished it from the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Citizens United.  As noted above, the Montana Court emphasized that the case 
before them was distinguishable from Citizens United because it concerned Montana 
law and political elections and it arose from Montana history.87  The Montana Court 
focused on three issues where Montana’s political climate and laws are 
distinguishable from Citizens United.  The first issue is that forming a PAC under 
Montana law is not as burdensome as the formation of a PAC under federal law.  
The second issue is that, unlike the federal government in Citizens United, the 
Montana government was able to demonstrate a compelling state interest for the 
prohibition on corporate independent political spending, including anti-corruption 
and anti-distortion interests.  The third issue is that the Montana Court relied on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton, and held that the interest in protecting the 
independence of the Montana judiciary was paramount.   
                                                           
 80 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 81 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 30 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Caperton, 129 
S. Ct. at 2263-64). 
 82 Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910). 
 83 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002).   
 84 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 31 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing White, 536 U.S. 
at 788).   
 85 Id. at 110. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 15; see Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (plurality opinion) (“[a] 
ruling of unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives of the people.”); 
see also Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 289 (1921) (a “statute may 
be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.”). 
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A.  Distinguishing Citizens United 
The Montana Court held that Citizens United was decided upon its facts and 
involved “unique and complex” rules that govern speech in Federal elections.88  The 
court also made the important point that restrictions upon speech are not per se 
unlawful and may be upheld if the government can demonstrate a sufficiently strong 
interest.89  The Montana Court relied on the Supreme Court’s endorsement of FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life,90 which “clearly endorsed an analysis of restrictions on 
speech, placing the burden upon the government to establish a compelling interest.”91   
1.  Ease of Creating a PAC 
The first distinction the Montana Court made was that the regulatory burden in 
Montana for creation of a PAC is far less burdensome then the federal regulatory 
burden.  Under federal law, PACs must “appoint a treasurer, forward donations to 
the treasurer promptly, keep detailed records of the identities of the persons making 
donations, preserve receipts for three years, and file an organization statement and 
report changes to this information within 10 days.”92  In contrast, under Montana 
law, a PAC can be formed and maintained by filing simple and straight-forward 
forms and reports.93  The Montana Court also relied on evidence that MSSF had 
established multiple PACs and used them to participate in the Montana political 
process and that Kenneth Champion, as sole shareholder of CPI, could easily 
establish a PAC to advocate for the corporation’s interests.94   
The dissent emphasizes that even though the Supreme Court relied in part on the 
regulatory burden imposed by federal law, they went further to say that a “PAC is a 
separate association from the corporation” and “the option to form PACs does not 
alleviate the First Amendment problems.95  Even though the Supreme Court 
specifically states that PACs do not allow a corporation to speak,96 the language 
cited by the Montana Court seems to indicate that if the regulatory burden to 
establish a PAC under federal law was not so onerous, a prohibition on corporate 
political expenditures may not violate the First Amendment.  The ability of PACs to 
speak for corporations is discussed later in this Article.97 
                                                           
 88 W. Tradition P’Ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 5. 
 89 Id. at 6 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010); 
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1986)).  
 90 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).  
 91 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 6 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898).   
 92 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 330-32 (2003) (quoting Mass. 
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. at 253-54).   
 93 Western Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 19. 
 94 Id. at 20. 
 95 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See infra Part V.B.  
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2.  Compelling State Interests 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court applied the rule that restrictions upon 
speech “are not per se unlawful, but rather may be upheld if the government 
demonstrates a sufficiently strong interest.”98  This requires the government to prove 
that the law furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to that 
interest.  The Montana Court found that the “factual record before a court is critical 
to determining the validity of a governmental provision restricting speech.”99  The 
court concluded that the Montana Statute was constitutional because the government 
had demonstrated a compelling interest for the restriction on speech, and the 
restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.100  The Montana Court 
relied on two rationales for their conclusion: an anti-corruption rationale and an anti-
distortion rationale. 
a.  Anti-Corruption Rationale 
The Montana Court spent considerable time discussing how the Montana Statute 
could not “be understood outside the context of the time and place it was enacted.”101  
The court described how at the time the Montana Statute was enacted, Montana 
political contests “were marked by rough contests for political and economic 
domination . . . between mining and industrial enterprises controlled by foreign 
trusts or corporations.”102  The court relied on affidavits reflecting that corporate 
dominated campaigns will only work in the essential interest of outsiders with local 
interests a very secondary consideration. and that Montana politics are more 
susceptible to corruption than federal campaigns.103 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court made a blanket statement that 
“independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo 
corruption.”104  They relied on the record in McConnell to show that there were no 
direct examples of votes being exchanged for candidate-centered issue advocacy 
expenditures.105  This issue will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article.106 
b.  Anti-Distortion Rationale 
The Montana Court also discussed the distorting effect that would be created by 
allowing unlimited corporate expenditures.  The court found that “[w]hile Montana 
has a clear interest in preserving the integrity of its electoral process, it also has an 
                                                           
 98 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
 99 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 6. 
 100 Id. at 40. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 8. 
 103 Id. at 20. 
 104 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010).  (emphasis in 
original). 
 105 Id. (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 560 (D.D.C. 
2003)).   
 106 See infra Part IV.E.   
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interest in encouraging the full participation of the Montana electorate.”107  The court 
relied upon data showing that “individual voter contributions are diminished from 48 
percent of the total raised by candidates in states where a corporate spending ban has 
been in place to 23 percent of the total raised by candidates in states that permit 
unlimited corporate spending.”108   
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court found that “[i]f the anti-distortion 
rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban political 
speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate 
form.”109  The Supreme Court further held that the government does not have “an 
interest ‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 
outcome of elections.’”110   
3.  Reliance on Caperton 
The Montana Court relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Caperton and 
held that Montana had a compelling interest in protecting its system of elected 
judges.  The court found that Montana judicial elections were particularly vulnerable 
to large levels of corporate spending and would affect the public’s perception of 
judicial impartiality.111  The court further found that “the free speech rights of the 
corporations are no more important than the due process rights of litigants in 
Montana courts to a fair and independent judiciary, and both are constitutionally 
protected.”112 
In Caperton, the Supreme Court found that a judge was required to recuse 
himself “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant 
and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or 
directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”113 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that “Caperton’s holding was limited to 
the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could 
be banned” and that recusal was the remedy for protecting the due process rights of 
litigants, not banning corporate speech.114  However, the Supreme Court in Caperton 
stated that large independent expenditures in support of a judicial candidate could 
create a serious, objective risk of actual bias that violated an opposing litigant‘s due 
process rights and that even though there was no allegation of a quid pro quo 
agreement, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to 
Blankenship for the extraordinary efforts to get him elected.115   
                                                           
 107 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 11. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904. 
 110 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 111 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc., 271 P.3d at 12. 
 112 Id. at 12. 
 113 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 (2009). 
 114 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. 
 115 Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262. 
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IV.  CAMPAIGN FINANCE EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court made blanket statements concerning 
corporate independent expenditures.  The Supreme Court stated that “independent 
expenditures do not lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption” 
and “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the 
candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a 
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”116  The Supreme Court 
also held that “[n]o sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political 
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”117  This part analyzes the current 
available data to see whether these statements made by the Supreme Court are 
supported by the evidence.  
A.  States’ “Unique” Histories 
The Montana Court emphasized that the case before them was distinguishable 
from Citizens United, because it concerned Montana law and political elections, and 
it arose from Montana history.118  The court held that Montana political elections are 
different because of the history of corruption and corporate domination.119  As of 
January 2010, twenty-four states had laws that prohibited or restricted independent 
corporate political expenditures.120   
For example, Arizona enacted the Clean Elections Act121 in 1998 after a political 
scandal that saw ten percent of the Arizona state legislature indicted on corruption-
related charges.122  In 1991, the political scandal “rocked the state as a grand jury 
charged seven legislators, five lobbyists and five others with felonies including 
bribery, money laundering and filing false campaign statements.”123 
In 1996, the Alaska legislature “enacted sweeping reforms to its campaign 
finance system.  Corruption and the appearance of corruption had led to low voter 
turnout and widespread disillusionment with the electoral system.”124  The 
                                                           
 116 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902. 
 117 Id. at 913. 
 118 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 15 (Mont. 2011).  
 119 See id. 
 120  Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 2, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607#laws.  The states include: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id. 
 121 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-941 (2012). 
 122 A Brief History of Corruption Leading to Arizona Voters’ Adoption of the Clean 
Elections System, ARIZ. ADVOCACY NETWORK (Mar. 2, 2013), http://stoptheazpower 
grab.com/files/Brief_History_of_Corruption_in_AZ_Politics.pdf (“In 1991, Arizona Voters 
witnessed nearly 10 percent of their State legislature indicted on corruption-related charges in 
a scandal that came to be known as AzScam.  Video of the sting showed legislators stuffing 
tens of thousands of dollars into gym bags while making comments such as, “I sold way too 
cheap’ and ‘There’s not an issue in the world I give a [expletive] about.’”).   
 123 Scandal in Phoenix, TIME MAG., Feb. 18, 1991.   
 124 Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003).   
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subsequent investigation was headed by the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. 
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).125  The investigation looked “into political corruption of 
lawmakers in the Alaska State Legislature, focusing in particular on lawmakers' 
official actions in relation to the oil industry, fisheries, and private corrections 
industry.”126  As of May 2007, the investigation had resulted in indictments against 
four current and former Alaska state legislators on corruption charges.127  In 2003, 
FBI agents, posing as employees of a fake company, asked members of the 
Tennessee legislature to support legislation that would advance the company's 
business in Tennessee.  The legislators agreed to do so if they were to be paid for 
their introduction of legislation.128   
In Missouri, in the early 1990s, a reporter, Terry Ganey, uncovered a scandal 
involving campaign contributions directed to the Missouri Attorney General, 
William L. Webster, who was running for governor at the time.129  In Missouri, the 
Second Injury Fund was supposed to supplement worker’s compensation benefits for 
injuries suffered on the job.130  Ganey found that “unusually large contributions were 
flowing to Attorney General Webster's campaign for re-election from a small group 
of St. Louis lawyers filling claims against the fund.”131  The investigation uncovered 
that lawyers who contributed to Webster had obtained much larger settlements from 
the fund for their clients than those lawyers who did not contribute to his 
campaign.132  Ganey accomplished this by analyzing information from Second Injury 
Fund documents and compared them with Webster’s campaign disclosure reports.133  
The two main lawyers behind the scandal pled guilty to charges that they conspired 
to use the Second Injury Fund to raise campaign contributions for Webster; 
subsequently they testified against Webster and he was sentenced to two years in 
prison.134 
In the 2008 Oregon state elections, the Public Employees Local 503 Union, 
whose parent organization is Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”), 
provided $320,958 dollars to John Kroger, who was running for Attorney General of 
Oregon; Kroger ended up winning the election.135  Attorney General Kroger 
                                                           
 125 Alaska Political Corruption Probe, SUNSHINE REVIEW (Mar. 2, 2013), http://sunshine 
review.org/index.php/Alaska_political_corruption_probe#cite_note-mauer-probeledby-10.  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 John Branston, U.S. Indicts 4 Tennessee Lawmakers in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 2005. 
 129 Terry Ganey, How Post Reporter Uncovered Second Injury Fund Scandal, ST. LOUIS 
DISPATCH, Mar. 1, 1994.  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Oregon 2008: Contributors, FOLLOW THE MONEY (2008), http://www.followthemoney. 
org/database/StateGlance/contributor.phtml?d=600611244.  
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subsequently appointed a former SEIU attorney to oversee elections.136  At the very 
least, this action raises the specter of quid pro quo corruption. i.e., rewarding a large 
expenditure with a favorable position in the new administration.   
In Connecticut, from 1998 to 2002, TBI Construction, a construction company 
run by the Tomasso family, received construction contracts worth more than $100 
million dollars in exchange for contributing over $400,000 dollars to Governor John 
Rowland’s re-election campaigns.137  TBI was awarded a $37 million dollar no-bid 
contract in March 1999 and a $52 million dollar no-bid contract in May 1999.138  
Governor Rowland also appointed TBI’s president to the juvenile justice advisory 
panel that advised the Connecticut government on policy and funding, although he 
seemed to lack the qualifications or experience to service on the panel.139  It is 
important to note that all of the contributions themselves were legal under 
Connecticut law.140 
For the Montana Court, they found that the government was able to show not 
only that a compelling state interest existed at the time the Montana Statute was 
enacted, but they were also able to show that the factors that led to the corruption 
were still present today.141  A state must show that, regardless of the language used 
by the Supreme Court in Citizens United, corporate independent expenditures can 
lead to corruption.  This Article provides ample empirical evidence that even though 
an expenditure is not directly “coordinated” with a candidate, it can still lead the 
candidate to favor the corporation making the expenditures and rewarding those 
contributors.142   
Many states legislatures have also issued resolutions voicing their disagreement 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.  In Idaho, the state legislature 
urged Congress “to affirm the power of the states to set limits, through lawmaking or 
constitutional amendment, on all forms of contributions and expenditures made by 
corporations and labor organizations to influence the outcome of elections in the 
states.”143  In Kentucky, the state legislature expressed “deep disappointment over 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Citizens United,” and 
stated that the “the framers of the Kentucky Constitution recognized the possibility 
that corporate spending could corrupt and distort the electoral process.”144  In New 
Jersey, the state legislature expressed “strong opposition to U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                           
 136 Larry Huss, The Corruption of Campaign Contributions, OR. CATALYST (Dec. 31, 
2008), http://oregoncatalyst.com/1955-The-Corruption-of-Campaign-Contributions.html.  
 137 CONN. COMMON CAUSE, THE ROWLAND CORRUPTION TRAIL BEGINS ON THE CAMPAIGN 
TRAIL (Jan. 30, 2004), available at http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3C17E2-
CDD1-4DF6-92BE-BD4429893665%7D/Corruption%20Trail.pdf.  
 138 Id. at 4. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011). 
 142 The issue of explicit and implicit coordination between candidates and PACs will be 
discussed in greater detail later in the Article.   
 143 H.J. Memorial 12, 2010 Leg. 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010).  
 144 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010).  
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decision in Citizens United,” and requested that Congress “propose an amendment to 
the United States Constitution to provide that, with respect to corporation campaign 
spending, a person is only a natural person for First Amendment protection of free 
speech.”145   
In Pennsylvania, the state legislature urged Congress to amend the U.S. 
Constitution to state that “[e]ach State shall have the power to limit the contributions 
to or expenditures by any person or committee made in support of, in opposition to, 
or to influence the nomination or election of any person to State or local office.”146  
In South Dakota, the state legislature called upon Congress to “propose and to ratify 
a constitutional amendment that would reverse the Supreme Court's decision in the 
case of [Citizens United] in order to protect our democracy from undue corporate 
influence and ensure that the people continue to have a voice in the operation of 
government.”147  In Washington, the state legislature requested that Congress 
“transmit to the several states for ratification an amendment to the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution so that corporations will not be 
considered as persons for the purposes of electioneering communications or direct 
contributions to candidates for public office.”148 
Many states have unique histories and circumstances that require different 
standards for regulating political elections.  Courts have determined that a one-size-
fits-all approach is not appropriate in all cases affecting constitutional rights 
including Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases149 and Fifth Amendment due 
process cases.150  The Court should have extended this same type of factual specific 
analysis to its holding in Citizens United.  
B.  Lack of Transparency 
One reason why the Supreme Court should have revisited the holding in Citizens 
United is the empirical data reflecting the difficulty of obtaining evidence of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption due to the lack of transparency 
concerning corporate independent political expenditures.  The Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) provides that any person who spends more than 
$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year must file a 
disclosure statement with the FEC.151  The BCRA also provides that the statement 
must identify the person making the expenditure, the amount of the expenditure, the 
election to which the communication was directed, and the names of certain 
contributors.152  Even with the disclosure provisions of the BCRA, the Supreme 
Court in McConnell found that “[t]here was evidence in the record that independent 
                                                           
 145 Assembly R. 64, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010).  
 146 H.R. 653, 2010 Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010). 
 147 H.R. Con. Res 1018, 2010 Leg., 85th Sess. (S. D. 2010).  
 148 S.J. Memorial 8027, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess.. (Wash. 2010).  
 149 See, e.g., United States v. McGregor, 650 F.3d 813 (1st Cir. 2011).   
 150 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993).  
 151 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(1) (West 2002).  
 152 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(2) (West 2002). 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/7
2013] BUYING THE ELECTORATE 461 
 
groups were running election-related advertisements ‘while hiding behind dubious 
and misleading names.’”153   
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court held that the prohibition 
on corporate independent political expenditures was invalid as applied to 
expenditures that did not constitute “express advocacy” or the “functional equivalent 
of express advocacy.”154  The Court explained that a communication is the 
“functional equivalent of express advocacy” only if it “is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.”155  In 2007, the FEC promulgated rules to implement the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Wisconsin Right to Life.  The FEC rule provided that disclosure 
would only be mandated for disbursements that were “made for the purpose of 
furthering electioneering communications.”156  The FEC reasoned that organizations 
may have funding sources other than donations and that those persons may not 
support the electioneering communications and that compliance with the disclosure 
requirements would impose a burden on those organizations.157 
In March 2012, in Van Hollen v. FEC, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia found in favor of a plaintiff who challenged the FEC regulation regarding 
disclosure by corporations and unions that fund “electioneering communications.”158  
The Court held that the language of the BCRA disclosure provision was not 
ambiguous, and “there [was] no question that the regulation promulgated by the FEC 
directly contravenes the Congressional goal of increasing transparency disclosure in 
electioneering communications.”159  The Court further held that the disclosure 
provision plainly required every person who funds electioneering communications to 
disclose contributors who contributed more than $1,000 during the reporting period 
and that “there are no terms limiting that requirement to call only for the names of 
those who transmitted funds accompanied by an express statement that the 
contribution was intended for the purpose” of making electioneering 
communications.160 
It is unclear how the recent decision in Van Hollen will affect the corporate 
independent disclosure regime implemented by FEC regulations.  It is important to 
note that even though Citizens United invalidated any prohibition on corporate 
independent political expenditures, it left the disclosure provision of the BCRA 
intact.161  The Supreme Court held that that disclosure “would help citizens ‘make 
                                                           
 153 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (quoting 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003)). 
 154 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470-76 (2007). 
 155 Id. at 470. 
 156 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) (2011).   
 157 Explanation and Justification for Final Rules on Electioneering Communications, 72 
Fed. Reg. 72,899 (Dec. 26, 2007).   
 158 See Van Hollen v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915 (2010).   
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informed choices in the political marketplace.’”162  However, the evidence reflects 
that the reality of political expenditures is that they are shrouded in secrecy and lack 
the transparency referenced by the Supreme Court.   
In an April 2012 Washington Post study, politically active non-profit groups that 
did not reveal their funding sources spent $28.5 million dollars on advertising related 
to the 2012 presidential race, or about 90 percent of the total through April 21, 
2012.163  The study reflects that there is a shift away from PACs, which are required 
to disclose their donors to the FEC, and instead, the 2012 presidential race was likely 
dominated by non-profit organizations that did not have to identify their financial 
backers.164  These non-profit organizations are able to circumvent the disclosure laws 
because “their ads are considered ‘issue ads’ [and] they do not specifically urge 
viewers to vote for a particular candidate.  The strategy allows them to conform to 
[IRS] rules for ‘social welfare’ groups, which do not have to disclose their donors as 
long as their ‘primary purpose’ is not politics.”165  These social welfare groups will 
be discussed in further detail later in the Article.166 
It is interesting to note that Western Tradition Partnership actually prided itself 
on the same type of secrecy that the Supreme Court in Citizens United cautioned 
against.  Western Tradition Partnership represented to contributors that there was no 
limit to how much an individual or corporation could give, and that they were “not 
required to report the name or the amount of any contribution that we receive . . . no 
politician, no bureaucrat, and no radical environmentalist will ever know you helped 
make this program possible.”167  This language is in direct contravention with the 
statements made by the majority in Citizens United, specifically that “transparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to 
different speakers and messages.”168 
C.  Supreme Court’s Narrow View of Corruption 
Corruption is defined as “covering a multitude of official delinquencies, great 
and little; but it is strictly accurate to apply it to any color of influence, of mere 
relation of any kind, on the administration of justice.”169  By analyzing the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence concerning independent political expenditures in the context 
of the First Amendment, the overwhelming conclusion is that the Supreme Court has 
a very narrow view of corruption in regard to corporate independent expenditures.   
In Buckley, the Supreme Court found that because independent expenditures did 
not give rise to quid pro quo corruption, they would not be recognized as a 
                                                           
 162 Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003)). 
 163 Dan Eggen, Most Independent Ads for 2012 Election are from Groups that Don’t 
Disclose Donors, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2012. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See infra Part IV.F.  
 167 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 7 (Mont. 2011) (citing Western 
Tradition Partnership, 2010 Election Year Program Executive Briefing). 
 168 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).   
 169 BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).   
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compelling government interest to restrict corporate political speech.170  In 
McConnell, the Court stated that the evidence did “‘not [show] any direct examples 
of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.’”171  In Citizens United, the Court 
held that “[w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to 
quid pro quo corruption.”172 
It is in this line of reasoning that the Supreme Court has distinguished 
“contributions” and “independent expenditures,” with only the former raising a 
concern for corruption.  However, the line between “contributions” and 
“independent expenditures” is often blurred, and in Caperton, the Supreme Court 
actually held them to be interchangeable by repeatedly referring to Blankenship's 
spending on behalf of Justice Benjamin that consisted of 99.97% independent 
expenditures ($3 million) and 0.03% direct contributions ($1,000) as 
“contributions.”173  This issue will be discussed in further detail later in the Article.174 
D.  Public Perception 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court relied on its decision in Buckley by 
holding that “the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption” are both 
sufficiently important government interests.175  “[P]reventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government 
interests [] identified for restricting campaign finances.”176  The Supreme Court has 
“long recognized ‘the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption’ in election campaigns.”177  This is an important distinction 
for states to make when challenging Citizens United and states must emphasize that 
under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, the “appearance of corruption” is a 
compelling government interest.   
The empirical evidence does not support the Supreme Court’s blanket statements 
concerning corruption and the public perception of corruption.  In a January 2010 
                                                           
 170 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1976) (per curiam). 
 171 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 560 (2003).   
 172 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909.   
 173 Id. at 967-68 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263-64 
(2009)). 
 174 See infra Part IV.E.  
 175 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. 
 176 Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008) (quoting Fed. Election 
Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 490 (1985)); see also 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 268 (2006) (plurality opinion) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“the 
interests the Court has recognized as compelling, i.e., the prevention of corruption or the 
appearance thereof”); see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-
97 (1981) (“Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political 
activity were contrary to the First Amendment.  The exception relates to the perception of 
undue influence of large contributors to a candidate.”). 
 177 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (quoting 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam)).  
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
464 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:443 
 
Gallup poll, 55 percent of respondents agreed that corporations should be treated the 
same as individuals under the campaign finance regulations; however, 76 percent 
responded that there should be limits on corporate political spending.178  In a 
February 2010 Washington Post-ABC News poll, nearly 80 percent of poll 
respondents opposed the Citizens United decision to allow unfettered corporate 
political spending, with 65 percent “strongly” opposed.179  In a February 2010 
Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research poll, 64 percent of respondents opposed the 
Citizens United decision.180   
An April 2012 survey conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice found that 69 
percent of those surveyed believed that the ability of corporations to give unlimited 
amounts of money to PACs will lead to corruption.181  The survey also found that 65 
percent of those surveyed said that they trusted the government less due to PACs 
having more influence than regular voters.182  Ironically, in Citizens United, the 
Supreme Court stated that the First Amendment was premised on mistrust of 
governmental power and stood against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or 
viewpoints.183 
This data reflects that even though there was support for the Citizens United 
decision immediately after it was announced, public support has decreased 
tremendously over the past two years.  The polls reflect that this change occurred, 
because there is a majority belief that the ability of corporations and super PACs to 
spend unlimited amounts of money in political elections will lead to corruption and 
increasing mistrust of government officials.   
There is also empirical data reflecting that even in states that imposed a ban or 
placed limits on campaign contributions and independent expenditures, corporations 
were still able to give to politicians indirectly.  For example, in Louisiana, 
companies are limited to making a $5,000 dollar contribution to a candidate per 
election or $10,000 dollars for certain PACs.184  Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal’s 
wife, Supriya Jindal, has a charitable foundation that provides equipment and 
                                                           
 178 Lydia Saad, Public Agrees with Court: Campaign Money is ‘Free Speech, GALLUP 
POLITICS (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/125333/Public-Agrees-Court-
Campaign-Money-Free-Speech.aspx.  
 179 Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on Campaign 
Financing, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010.  
 180 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner, Common Cause, Change Congress, Public Campaign 
Action Fund, Frequency Questionnaire (Feb. 2-4, 2010), available at http://www.gqrr.com/ 
articles/2425/5606_cc10020410fq1.pdf.  
 181 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, NATIONAL SURVEY: SUPER PACS, 
CORRUPTION, AND DEMOCRACY 2 (Apr. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BAC81D4FF-0476-4E28-B9 
B1-7619D271A334%7D&DE=%7BE9D08E3E-2D85-4123-A7E2-920AF8015EA8%7D& 
Design=PrintView; see also ABC News/Washington Post, Poll, available at http:// 
www.langerresearch.com/uploads/1135a3Super PACs.pdf.  
 182 See supra note 181. 
 183 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882-83 (2010).   
 184 For Summaries of the Louisiana Campaign Finance Disclosure Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18:1481 et seq. (2013), see Campaign Finance Related Laws, LA. ETHICS ADMIN. PROGRAM, 
http://ethics.la.gov/EthicsPublicationSearch.aspx?portal=CampFinLaws.  
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss2/7
2013] BUYING THE ELECTORATE 465 
 
supplies for schools throughout the state.185  AT&T Corp., which needed Governor 
Jindal to sign off on legislation allowing the company to sell cable television 
services without having to negotiate with individual parishes, has pledged at least 
$250,000 dollars to the Supriya Jindal Foundation for Louisiana’s Children.  
Marathon Oil, which won approval from the Jindal administration to increase the 
amount of oil it could refine at its Louisiana plant, also committed to a $250,000 
dollar donation.186  Northrop Grumman, a military contractor which got state 
officials to help set up an airplane maintenance facility at a former Air Force base, 
promised $10,000 dollars to the charity.187  
It is important to note that none of these contributions were illegal and the 
Governor has not been accused of any wrong-doing.  However, political watch-dog 
groups have condemned this type of behavior.  Anne Rolfes, director of the 
environmental group Louisiana Bucket Brigade, stated that the donations may be for 
a good cause, but “it creates the appearance [Governor Jindal] is being bribed.”188  
Melanie Sloan, director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics, stated that “the 
donations that come in to charities like this are almost always from folks who want 
something from a politician.”189   
The Supreme Court in Citizens United upheld that rationale from Buckley that the 
government has an “important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”190  Even though the Supreme Court has a very narrow 
view of corruption,191 the empirical evidence provided in this Article meets that 
threshold and the Supreme Court should have revisited Citizens United in light of 
that evidence.   
E.  Independent Expenditures and the Independence of Super PACs 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court goes to great lengths to distinguish 
independent expenditures and direct contributions to political candidates.  
Independent political expenditures are defined as “an expenditure by a person 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is 
made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized 
committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at 
the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of 
such candidate.”192   
                                                           
 185 Eric Lipton, Wife’s Charity Offers Corporate Tie to a Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2011.  
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010).   
 191 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 
(1985) (“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political 
favors.”). 
 192 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(17) (West 2002).   
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The Supreme Court relied upon the decision in McConnell when stating that the 
evidence did “‘not [show] any direct examples of votes being exchanged for . . . 
expenditures.’”193  The Court further held that “the independent expenditure ceiling . 
. . fails to serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality or 
appearance of corruption in the electoral process.”194  It is important to note that the 
Supreme Court only quoted part of the language from McConnell.  The Court in 
McConnell went on to state that “the record presents an appearance of corruption 
stemming from the dependence of officeholders and parties on advertisements run by 
these outside groups.”195  The Court further stated that “[t]he record powerfully 
demonstrates that electioneering communications paid for with the general treasury 
funds of labor unions and corporations endears those entities to elected officials in a 
way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting.196  This is an important 
omission that, if included, would have changed the context of the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Citizens United.   
The Supreme Court believes that because independent expenditures do not 
involve collusion between the party making the expenditure and the candidate, there 
is no concern for corruption.  “The absence of prearrangement and coordination . . . 
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper 
commitments from the candidate.”197  This Article asserts that the Supreme Court’s 
statement is untenable.   
For example, the “Make Us Great Again” Super PAC, 198 which is a candidate-
specific super PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of Texas Governor Rick 
Perry, was backed by Mike Toomey, who is a lobbyist who once served as Governor 
Perry’s chief of staff.199  “Toomey also shares a business venture with a top Rick 
Perry campaign aide.  According to state records, Toomey is a co-owner of a New 
Hampshire luxury resort island with Dave Carney, chief strategist for the Perry 
campaign.”200  The “Restore Our Future” Super PAC, which is a candidate-specific 
super PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of former Massachusetts 
Governor Mitt Romney, was backed by Carl Forti, who was the national political 
director for Mitt Romney’s 2008 Presidential bid.201  The “Winning Our Future” 
                                                           
 193 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 
U.S. 93, 560 (2003)).   
 194 Id. at 902 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 195 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 560.   
 196 Id. 
 197 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902 (quoting Buckley, 242 U.S. at 47). 
 198 Mission, MAKE US GREAT AGAIN, http://makeusgreatagain.com/mission/ (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2013) (“The mission of Make Us Great Again is to support Rick Perry for the 
Republican nomination for President in 2012, to oppose Barack Obama’s reelection, and to 
support Rick Perry in the general election in November 2012.”). 
 199 Robert Farley, Make Us Great Again, FACTCHECK.ORG (Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2011/10/make-us-great-again. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Andy Kroll, Mitt Romney's $12 Million Mystery Man, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/01/carl-forti-romney-super-PAC.  
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Super PAC, which is a candidate-specific super PAC that supported the 2012 
Presidential bid of Newt Gingrich, was backed by Rick Tyler, who is a former 
Gingrich spokesman and aide.202   
The “Priorities USA Action” Super PAC, which is a candidate-specific super 
PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of the incumbent United States 
President Barack Obama, was backed by Bill Burton, who is a former White House 
deputy press secretary.203  Billionaire Sheldon Adelson and his family, who donated 
$16.5 million dollars to the “Winning Our Future” Super PAC, personally conferred 
with Newt Gingrich at fundraisings events.204  Billionaire Foster Friess, who 
bankrolled the “Red White and Blue Fund” Super PAC, which is a candidate-
specific super PAC that supported the 2012 Presidential bid of Rick Santorum, 
traveled with Santorum to campaign events.205 
The political candidates themselves and high-ranking and campaign staffers can 
also be seen at events hosted by these Super PACs, which further erodes the strength 
of the Supreme Court’s argument that these organizations are independent and do 
not collude with the candidates.  In August 2011, Mitt Romney attended the first part 
of a fundraising event for the “Restore Our Future” Super PAC.206  In March 2012, 
David Plouffe, a top political adviser to President Obama, appeared at a fundraising 
event for the “Priorities USA Action” Super PAC.207  These events show that the line 
between political candidates and the super PACs that support them, and 
subsequently independent expenditures and coordinated communications, are often 
blurred.   
For further evidence that these groups are not as independent as the Supreme 
Court believes them to be, Mitt Romney’s Presidential campaign team and the 
“Restore Our Future” Super PAC use the same consulting firm, TargetPoint 
Consulting.208  To muddy the water even further, “in the same suite [of offices] is 
WWP Strategies, whose co-founder is married to TargetPoint’s CEO and works for 
the Romney campaign.”209  Mike Toomey, chief financial backer of the “Make Us 
Great Again” Super PAC is a partner in The Texas Lobby Group, whose clients 
                                                           
 202 Andy Kroll, Candidates and the Totally Unrelated Super-PACs That Love Them, 
MOTHER JONES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/01/stephen-colbert-
citizens-united-super-pac.  
 203 Id. 
 204 Trevor Potter, Five Myths About Super PACs, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2012.  
 205 Id. 
 206 Nicholas Confessore, Lines Blur Between Candidates and PACs with Unlimited Cash, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2011.  
 207 Michael Luo & Nicholas Confessore, Top Obama Adviser to Appear at ‘Super PAC’ 
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:37 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/03/02/top-obama-adviser-to-appear-at-super-pac-meeting.  
 208 Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between ‘Super PACs’ and Campaigns, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 25, 2012.  
 209 Id. (“Restore Our Future, for example, has paid TargetPoint Consulting nearly $350,000 
for survey research.  Meanwhile, the Romney campaign has paid TargetPoint nearly $200,000 
for direct mail consulting.  In one instance, the campaign and the super PAC paid TargetPoint 
on the same day.”). 
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include the drug company Merck Sharp & Dohme (Merck).  In 2007, Governor 
Perry issued an executive order requiring young girls to get a Merck-made vaccine 
designed to prevent a sexually transmitted disease that can lead to cervical cancer.210  
Under FEC regulations, the coordination rule’s “conduct” standards are also met by 
use of a “common vendor” absent a firewall, or involvement of a person or 
contractor who had been employed by the candidate in the previous 120 days, absent 
a firewall.211 
The political candidates themselves also contribute to blurring the lines of 
independence.  For example, the New York Times reported that in the summer of 
2011, when discussing a large donation to the “Restore Our Future” Super PAC by 
one of his former business partners, Mitt Romney characterized it as a donation to 
himself.212  Based upon this evidence, when looking at the independence of these 
groups, the Supreme Court would have had a hard time defending their earlier 
position.   
The Supreme Court should have also analyzed its own rationale from 
McConnell.213  In McConnell, the Supreme Court relied on “the close relationship 
between federal officeholders and the national parties” when upholding the federal 
ban on soft money contributions.214  The Supreme Court also specifically found that 
there was “no meaningful separation between the national party committees and the 
public officials who control them,’ because the national committees were ‘run by, 
and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates.’”215  The Supreme 
Court should have analogized this situation to the close ties between candidates and 
their respective super PACs.  Based upon the evidence reported in this Article, it 
should have been difficult for the Supreme Court to find that there was not at least 
the appearance of corruption from the political candidate’s intimate, albeit indirect, 
involvement with the super PAC organizations.  The Supreme Court also did not 
address the contention that “‘the absence of prearrangement and coordination’ does 
not eliminate . . . ‘danger’ that a candidate will understand the expenditure as an 
effort to obtain a quid pro quo.  The same is true of independent party 
expenditures.”216 
                                                           
 210 Exec. Order of the Governor of the State of Tex., RP65—Relating to the Immunization 
of Young Women from the Cancer-Causing Human Papilloma Virus (Feb. 2, 2007), available 
at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/executive-order/3455. 
 211 See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21(d)(1)-(5) and 109.21(h) (2010). 
 212 Id. 
 213 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).   
 214 Id. at 154. 
 215 Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 
2010) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 155); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154-55 (“[I]t is 
the close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the 
means by which parties have traded on that relationship, that have made all large soft-money 
contributions to national parties suspect.”).   
 216 Republican Party of Minn. v. Pauly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1015 (D. Minn. 1999) 
(quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 
615-16 (1996)). 
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F.  Political Dark Money and 501(c)(4) Organizations 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow.org v. FEC217 and 
EMILY'S List v. FEC218 established that PACs that sponsor independent campaign 
advocacy can collect unlimited contributions from their supporters.219  Subsequently, 
in July 2010, the FEC issued an Advisory Opinion stating that PACs “may solicit 
and accept unlimited contributions from individuals, political committees, 
corporations, and labor organizations.”220 
The effect of these decisions and from the Citizens United decision has been the 
rise in number of 501(c)(4) organizations, or social welfare organizations.221  Marcus 
S. Owens, former head of the IRS division that oversees section 501(c)(4) groups, 
was quoted as saying with regard to the new 501(c)(4)s being formed that the 
“groups are popping up like mushrooms after a rain.”222  To give a better idea of the 
amount of money spent by these groups, fifty-nine social welfare groups reported 
spending more than $78.6 million dollars on political ads during the 2010 election 
cycle, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.223  The Center for Responsive 
Politics also reported that the percentage of spending coming from groups that do 
not disclose their donors has risen from 1 percent to 47 percent since the 2006 
midterm elections and that 501(c)(4) spending increased from zero percent of total 
spending by outside groups in 2006 to 42 percent in 2010.224  The Center for 
Responsive Politics recently compiled a report showing that as of June 20, 2012, 
over $100 million dollars in contributions have been given to non-disclosing groups, 
i.e., 501(c)(4) organizations.225 
In order to be eligible for qualification as a social welfare organization, the 
organization must promote the “common good and general welfare” of the 
                                                           
 217 Speechnow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (2010). 
 218 EMILY’s List v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 581 F.3d 1 (2009).   
 219 FEC Approves Advisory Opinions for Independent Expenditure Committees, CTR. FOR 
EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Jul. 27, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11164.  
 220 Fed. Election Comm’n Advisory Op. 2010-11 (“Commonsense Ten”) (proposed Jul. 22, 
2010), available at http://www.fec.gov/agenda/2010/mtgdoc1042.pdf.  
 221 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).   
 222 M. Luo & S. Strom, Donors’ Names Kept Secret as They Influence the Midterms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010. 
 223 Kim Barker et al., With the Spotlight on Super PACs, Here's How Donors are Really 
Hiding Money, THE BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/with-
spotlight-on-super-pac-dollars-nonprofits-escape-scrutiny-2012-2.  
 224 Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG (May 5, 2011), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-
decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html.  
 225 See 2012 Outside Spending, by Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets. 
org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=U (last visited Mar. 4, 
2013).  
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community.226  It is important to note that Department of the Treasury regulations 
specifically state that intervention in a political campaign is not considered 
promotion of social welfare;227 however, social welfare organizations are “allowed to 
intervene in political campaigns, but intervening in a political campaign must not be 
their primary function.”228  It is also important to note that while the income of these 
social welfare organizations is tax-exempt, donations to the organizations are not 
deductible.229   
A concern has been raised about how to define when a 501(c)(4) organization is 
truly a social welfare organization whose primary purpose is to promote the common 
good.  In Vision Service Plan v. United States, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of California found that Vision Service Plan (VSP) was not a 
social welfare organization and, therefore, did not qualify for tax-exempt status 
under 501(c)(4).230  The district court found that while VSP offered some public 
benefits, they were not enough for us to conclude that VSP was primarily engaged in 
promoting the common good and general welfare of the community.231  In a recent 
case out of the Fourth Circuit, the court upheld the FEC’s approach to determining 
whether an organization is a PAC.232  In Real Truth About Abortion v. FEC, the court 
held that the FEC will first consider a group's political activities, such as spending on 
a particular electoral or issue-advocacy campaign and then it will evaluate an 
organization's "major purpose," as revealed by that group's public statements, 
fundraising appeals, government filings, and organizational documents.233  This will 
be an issue that will come up with many organizations who want to keep the 
identities of their donors secret, but also be able to contribute to political campaigns.   
                                                           
 226 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (1960) (“An organization embraced within this 
section is one which is operated primarily for the purpose of bringing about civic betterments 
and social improvements”). 
 227 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1960) (“The promotion of social welfare does not 
include direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in 
opposition to any candidate for public office”); see also Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194 
(An organization, “formed for the purpose of promoting an enlightened electorate,” whose 
primary activity was rating candidates for public office, was not exempt under I.R.C. 
501(c)(4) because such activity is not “the promotion of social welfare.”). 
 228 Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next 
‘Loophole’? (Mortiz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 
105, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020421 (citing I.R.C. § 527(f)) (emphasis 
added).   
 229 Id. 
 230 See Vision Serv. Plan v. United States, No. Civ. S-04-1993 LKK/JFM, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38812 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005), aff’d, 265 F. App’x 650 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 231 Id. at *13-14; see also Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 481 F.2d 175, 177 
(9th Cir. 1973) (noting that the district court made a quantitative comparison between the 
private and public benefits); Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Lake Forest, Inc., 305 F.2d 814, 
818 (4th Cir. 1962) (noting that the public benefits of organization were too insubstantial to 
qualify the organization as exempt under section 501(c)(4)). 
 232 See Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 555 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (citing Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 5596-97 (Feb. 7, 2007)). 
 233 Id. at 555 (citing Political Comm. Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 5595, 5596-97 (Feb. 7, 2007)). 
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This practice has received greater scrutiny since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United.  In January 2012, the IRS sent out letters to certain 501(c)(4) 
organizations, who are politically active to determine whether they are “primarily” 
engaged in social welfare and not political campaigning.234  If these organizations are 
found to not qualify for 501(c)(4) status, they could face severe penalties including 
fines and/or imprisonment.235  The 501(c)(4) organizations have retained counsel to 
fight the IRS inquiry, so this issue may stay undecided for some time.   
The IRS also recently revoked the tax-exempt status of a small political nonprofit 
organization, “Emerge America.”236  “Emerge America” was founded for the 
primary purpose of identifying and training democratic women to run for office, get 
elected and to seek higher office.237  The March 2012 IRS letter stated that “Emerge 
America” was not being operated primarily to promote social welfare because its 
activities were conducted primarily for the benefit of a political party and a private 
group of individuals, rather than the community as a whole.238   
A recent example of a 501(c)(4) organization that has raised red flags for the IRS 
is the recently created “Patriot Voices,” a group formed by ex-Presidential candidate 
Rick Santorum.  As noted above, to qualify as a social welfare organization, 
intervening in a political campaign must not be the organization’s primary 
function.”239  However, when announcing the creation of “Patriot Voices” in early 
June, Rick Santorum stated that “the defeat of Barack Obama, and those who support 
his policies, will be our first priority.”240  The IRS has not taken action as of the date 
of this Article, but multiple tax experts have opined that “Patriot Voices” will be 
under intense IRS scrutiny in the near future.241 
Another issue that arises with these organizations is unlike other political 
advocacy groups, such as PACs, they are not required to disclose their donors.242  
This has led many super PACs to form sister 501(c)(4) organizations.  For example, 
the super PAC “American Crossroads” has a sister 501(c)(4) organization named 
                                                           
 234 Jonathan Weisman, Scrutiny of Political Nonprofits Sets Off Claim of Harassment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012.  An example of the letter is available at http://www.documentcloud 
.org/documents/323502-letter-from-the-irs-to-tea-party-organizatio ns.html.  
 235 See I.R.C. § 7201 (Proposed Amendment 2011).   
 236 Jonathan D. Salant, IRS Denial of Tax Exemption to U.S. Political Group Spurs Alarms, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-08/irs-denial-
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 237 About Emerge, EMERGE AMERICA, http://www.emergeamerica.org/about (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2013).  
 238 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2012-21-028 (Mar. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1221028.pdf.  
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 240 Andy Kroll, Is Rick Santorum's New Dark-Money Group Breaking the Law?, MOTHER 
JONES (July 3, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/rick-santorum-patriot-
voices-dark-money-irs.  
 241 Id. 
 242 See Alex Trepp, 501(See)(4)s Leave Public Blind, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (Oct. 6, 
2011), http://harvardcrcl.org/2011/10/06/501see4s-leave-public-blind/.  
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“Crossroads Grass Roots Policy Strategies (GPS).”  The super PAC “Priorities USA 
Action” has a sister 501(c)(4) organization named Priorities USA” that had 
contributed over $215,000 dollars to the super PAC.243  The super PAC “Freedom 
Works for America,” shares an office and staff with its sister 501(c)(4) organization 
named “Freedom Works, Inc.”244 
For donors that want to maintain anonymity, they can simply donate to the 
501(c)(4) organization, who does not have to report its donors, who will then 
contribute those funds to the affiliated super PAC.245  When the super PAC files its 
contribution report with the FEC, it will only reflect the 501(c)(4) contribution.  A 
strong argument can be made that this type of activity harms the American people’s 
right to transparency regarding the financing of federal elections, which was held to 
be of paramount importance in Citizens United.246 
G.  Shell Corporations and Circumventing Disclosure and Tax Laws 
This Article asserts that individuals are circumventing disclosure and tax laws by 
creating shell corporations specifically set up for the sole purpose of contributing 
money to a PAC.  This practice violates the goal of transparency in the political 
system.  As the Supreme Court wrote in Citizens United, “transparency enables the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers 
and messages.”247  The Court also wrote that campaign finance disclosure laws “help 
citizens make informed choices in the political marketplace.”248 
In August 2011, the Campaign Legal Center249 and Democracy 21250 filed a 
complaint with the FEC based upon a $1 million dollar contribution to the “Restore 
Our Future” Super PAC.251  The complaint alleges that W Spann LLC and any 
                                                           
 243 Michael Beckel & Rachel Marcus, Donors to Conservative Super PAC Masked by 
Nonprofit, NATION OF CHANGE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nationofchange.org/donors-
conservative-super-pac-masked-nonprofit-1331561155.  
 244 Id. 
 245 See Letter from Gerald Herbert, Exec. Dir., Campaign Legal Ctr. & Fred Wertheimer, 
President, Democracy 21, to Hon. Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. & 
Lois Lerner, Dir. of the Exempt Org. Div., Internal Revenue Serv. (Oct. 5, 2010), available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/blogs/thecaucus/05IRSLETTER.pdf (requesting that the 
IRS investigate Crossroads GPS for operating in violation of tax status). 
 246 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010). 
 247 Id. at 916. 
 248 Id. at 914. 
 249 Mission Statement, THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., http://www.campaignlegalcenter 
.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=64 (last visited Mar. 4, 
2012) (“The Campaign Legal Center is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization which works in 
the areas of campaign finance and elections, political communication and government 
ethics.”). 
 250 Our Mission, DEMOCRACY 21, http://www.democracy21.org/our-mission/ (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2012) (“Democracy 21 is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to making 
democracy work for all Americans.”). 
 251 See Complaint Before the U.S. Fed. Election Comm’n, Campaign Legal Ctr. & 
Democracy 21 v. W Spann LLC. [hereinafter Spann FEC Complaint], available at http:// 
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person who created, operated and made contributions in the name of W Spann LLC 
may have violated the provisions of the Federal Election Commission Act 
(FECA).252  After the complaint was filed, the person who created W Spann LLC 
came forward, therefore I will use the individual’s name, Edward Conard, instead of 
the generic “John Doe” listed in the complaint.253   
As background information, W Spann LLC’s “corporate records provide no 
information about the owner of the firm, its address or its type of business.”254  The 
address included on “Restore Our Future’s” mid-year report for W Spann LLC is “a 
midtown Manhattan office building that has no record of such a tenant.”255  Records 
reflect that W Spann LLC was created on March 15, 2011, when a “certificate of 
formation” was filed with the Delaware Secretary of State’s Office.256  The 
complaint also alleges that W Spann LLC made a $1 million contribution to 
“Restore Our Future” Super PAC on April 28, 2011 and then filed a “certificate of 
cancellation” on July 11, effectively dissolving as a corporate entity.257 
The complaint alleges that Edward Conard violated federal law by making an 
individual contribution though a shell company, W Spann LLC.  The complainant 
alleges that this action violates federal election regulations by “[m]aking a 
contribution of money or anything of value and attributing as the source of the 
money or thing of value another person when in fact the contributor is the source.”258  
The complaint also alleges that W Spann LLC should have filed as a “political 
committee” with the FEC.259  Political committee, under the FECA, is defined as 
“any committee, club, association or other group of persons which receives 
contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year or which makes 
expenditures aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year.”260  The 
complainants allege that W Spann LLC “met the . . . test for political committee 
status by (1) being an entity or group of persons with the ‘major purpose’ of 
                                                           
www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/W_Spann_LLC_FEC_Complaint_Signed_and_N
otarized_8.5.11.pdf; see also Michael Isikoff, Firm Gives $1 Million to Pro-Romney Group, 
then Dissolves, NBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/44011308/ 
ns/politics-decision_2012.  The Campaign Legal Center also requested the Justice Department 
to pursue criminal charges; however, there is no evidence that criminal charges were filed. 
 252 See Spann FEC Complaint, supra note 251, ¶ 1.   
 253 Paul S. Ryan, Some Questions for Mitt Romney and Edward Conard, THE HILL (Aug. 
20, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/campaign/176305-some-questions-for-mitt-
romney-and-edward-conard.  
 254 See Spann FEC Complaint, supra note 251, ¶ 7 (quoting Isikoff, supra note 251).    
 255 Id. (quoting Isikoff, supra note 251).   
 256 Id. ¶ 8. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. ¶ 12 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2)(ii)). 
 259 Id. ¶ 22; see also 2 U.S.C.A. § 433 (West 2011) (political committee filing 
requirements).   
 260 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(4) (West 2002). 
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influencing the ‘nomination or election of a candidate’ and (2) by receiving 
‘contributions’ of $1,000 or more in a calendar year.”261 
The Campaign Legal Center has also filed complaints against Steven J. Lund, Eli 
Publishing, LC, and F8, LLC, for two separate contributions of $1 million dollars 
each made to the “Restore Our Future” Super PAC.262  Both companies, Eli 
Publishing and F8, share an address in Utah.263  News reports showed that the 
companies did not seem to do any real business and when the news reporter went to 
the address listed in the official filings, there was an accounting firm whose 
employees were not aware of those activities.264  Steven J. Lund, the registered agent 
for Eli Publishing, claimed that he used the corporation to make the contribution, 
because donating through a corporation has accounting advantages.265   
In May 2011, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) 
called for the IRS and the FEC to investigate whether the 501(C)(4) organization 
Commission on Hope, Growth and Opportunity (CHGO) violated tax and campaign 
finance laws.266  The complaint alleged that even though CHGO represented that it 
had not and would not spend any money on influencing political elections, Scott 
Reed, the organization’s founder,267 stated that the organization planned to raise $25 
million dollars to air political advertisements in 2012.268  In 2010, CHGO received 
over $4 million dollars from one donor, Meridian Strategies, LLC.269 
The complaint also alleged specific instances where CHGO has spent money for 
advertisements advocating the defeat of a political candidate.270  The complaint 
                                                           
 261 See Spann FEC Complaint, supra note 251, ¶ 22. 
 262 See Fed. Election Comm’n Complaints, Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. 
Steven J. Lund & Eli Publ’g, LC & Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. Steven J. Lund 
& F8, LLC [hereinafter Lund FEC Complaint]. 
 263 Lund FEC Complaint, supra note 262, ¶ 6 (citing Utah Government Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code website database).  
 264 Id. ¶ 9 (citing Max Roth, 2 Utah Companies Donate $1 million Apiece to Romney PAC, 
FOX 13 NEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.fox13now.com/news/local/kstu-mitt-romney-2-
utah-companiesdonate-1-million-apiece-to-romney-campaign-20110804,0,4424937.story).  
 265 Id. ¶ 10 (citing Roth, supra note 264). 
 266 CREW Renews Call for IRS, FEC to Investigate the Commission on Hope, Growth and 
Opportunity, CITIZENSFORETHICS.ORG (May 23, 2011), http://www.citizensforethics.org/legal-
filings/entry/irs-fec-complaints-commission-hope-growth-opportunity.   
 267 Brody Mullins & Danny Yadron, GOP Groups Launch Massive Ad Blitz, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 13, 2010.  
 268 Letter from Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., to Internal Revenue Serv. 3-4 
(May 23, 2011), available at http://crew.3cdn.net/2258532ac243e4ed58_32m6vthuy.pdf.     
Exhibits to the May 2012 IRS Letter are available at http://crew.3cdn.net/cb453 
82703b3ca4e0b_0hm6i0lpa.pdf.  
 269 CHGO 2010 Form 990, Schedule B, available at http://crew.3cdn.net/7b7d3553ee575 
4bca4_ kim6b0s9j.pdf. 
 270 Letter, supra note 268, at 6.   
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relied upon data from the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG),271 which 
showed that CHGO spent $2.3 million dollars on campaign advertisements from 
September 25, 2010 to November 1, 2010.272  The complaint further alleged that 
CHGO not only failed to report its spending to the FEC, it also failed to disclose it to 
the IRS.  CHGO asserted under penalty of perjury on its 2010 and 2011 tax returns it 
did not spend any money on political activities in either year.273  CREW contended 
that because the advertisements attacked Democratic candidates and advocated the 
election of Republican candidates, they went beyond mere issue advocacy and were 
political activity.274  CREW also calculated CHGO spent at least 51.5 percent of its 
total spending in 2010 producing and broadcasting the advertisements, making 
politics its primary activity in violation of its tax-exempt status.275  Because CHGO 
reported to the IRS, under penalty of perjury,276 that the organization did not spend 
any money on political adverting, those advertisements would be fraudulent speech, 
which as discussed below, does not receive First Amendment protection.   
These contributions show that not only are individuals gaining anonymity from 
creating shell corporations for the sole purpose of contributing to super PACs, they 
are also gaining tax advantages and possibly committing tax fraud.  The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence reflects that fraudulent statements and statements and speech 
integral to criminal conduct, which in this case would be political expenditures from 
a shell corporation made for the express purpose of circumventing tax laws, do not 
receive First Amendment protection.277  In Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court 
held that fraudulent speech generally falls outside the protections of the First 
Amendment.278  In Giboney v. Empire Storage, the Court held that the First 
Amendment does not immunize speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct 
in violation of a valid criminal statute.279   
The Supreme Court erred by not analyzing the government’s compelling interest 
in stopping tax fraud.  Because the assertions made to the IRS are under oath of 
perjury, they are not mere statements of falsehood.  The Supreme Court has 
                                                           
 271 “Campaign Media Analysis Group, a Kantar Media solution, is the exclusive source of  
. . . content analysis [and advertising expenditure data] for political, public affairs and issue 
advocacy [professionals].”  KANTAR MEDIA, http://www.kantarmediana.com/cmag/expertise.  
 272 Letter, supra note 268, at 3-4.   
 273 CHGO 2010 Form 990, pt. IV, ln. 3; CHGO 2011 Form 990, pt. IV, ln. 3, available at 
http://crew.3cdn.net/8ba93bf54d3a54b31b_yrm6bqld7.pdf. 
 274 Letter, supra note 268, at 5. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Failure to include required information on a tax return can make a tax-exempt entity 
liable for civil penalties, 26 U.S.C. § 6652(c)(1)(A)(ii), 6652(c)(4) (2006); Internal Revenue 
Serv., Instructions for Form 990 at 6-7 (2011), and willfully submitting a false tax return 
under penalty of perjury is a felony that can be punished by up to three years in prison and a 
fine of $100,000.  26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (2006). 
 277 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976); see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490 (1949).  
 278 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. 
 279 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498.  
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
476 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:443 
 
consistently upheld the constitutionality of perjury statutes.280  The Court has found 
that to “uphold the integrity of our trial system . . . the constitutionality of perjury 
statutes is unquestioned.”281  Even though the Supreme Court recently held that lying 
about your military service decorations is protected by the First Amendment,282 it did 
upheld the constitutionality of criminalizing perjured statements by finding that 
“perjured testimony ‘is at war with justice’ because it can cause a court to 
render a ‘judgment not resting on truth.’”283  
Another issue that arises from these shell corporations is the ability of foreign 
citizens to flood the U.S. political system with foreign money.  In Bluman v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, which will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia relied on Supreme Court 
jurisprudence when holding that “[t]he government may exclude foreign citizens 
from activities ‘intimately related to the process of democratic self-government.’”284  
According to Trevor Potter, former chairman of the FEC, it is “more difficult to 
enforce the ban on foreign spending when the source of the money is not publicly 
disclosed.”285   
There is empirical evidence that this practice is widespread and has been 
occurring for many years.  In 1992, John Huang, an employee of Lippo Group286 and 
a long-time friend of then Presidential candidate Bill Clinton, began to raise illegal 
foreign money for the Democratic National Committee (DNC) through Lippo Group 
owned shell companies; these contributions were reimbursed with funds from Lippo 
Group's headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia.287  In 1994, Haley Barbour, who was 
chairman of the Republican National Committee (RNC), persuaded a Hong Kong 
businessman, Ambrous Young, to post collateral of $2 million dollars in support of a 
loan to the National Policy Forum, which was a think tank presided over by Barbour, 
and a de facto subsidiary of the RNC.288  The collateral was posted by a shell 
corporation that had no assets other than money transferred from Hong Kong.289  In 
1997, the DNC returned a $250,000 dollar contribution from a recently established 
U.S. subsidiary of a South Korean electronics company because it violated a ban on 
donations from foreign nationals.290   
                                                           
 280 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978) (“unquestioned constitutionality of 
perjury statutes”); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U. S. 36, 51 n.10 (1961). 
 281 United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993).   
 282 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).   
 283 Id. at 2546 (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)).   
 284 Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 287 (2011) (quoting Bernal v. 
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984)). 
 285 Stephen Braun, Super PAC Foreign Donations a Risk in 2012 Presidential Election, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 10, 2012.  
 286 Lippo Group is an Indonesian industrial conglomerate.   
 287 S. REP. NO. 105-167 (1998). 
 288 Id.  
 289 Id. 
 290 H.R. REP. NO. 105-829 (1998).  The report details a $250,000 dollar contribution from a 
subsidiary of a South Korean company, Cheong Am America Inc.  The DNC acknowledged 
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Other examples include CITGO Petroleum Company, once the American-born 
Cities Services Company, but purchased in 1990 by the Venezuelan government-
owned Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. could allow Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez, who has sharply criticized both of the past two U.S. presidents, to spend 
government funds to defeat an American political candidate, just by having CITGO 
buy TV ads.291  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a trade association organized as a 
501(c)(6) that can raise and spend unlimited funds without ever disclosing any of its 
donors, operates foreign chapters of the Chamber in places abroad (which are known 
as "AmChams") which pay yearly dues to the U.S. Chamber; however, a 
spokeswoman for the Chamber stated that the AmChams are independent 
organizations and they do not fund political programs in the United States.292 
This evidence reinforces the dangers of allowing corporations to spend unlimited 
amounts of money in political campaigns.  It also reflects the danger of organizations 
to accept unlimited amounts of money without disclosing the source of the funds.  
The Supreme Court even agreed with this rationale in Citizens United when it stated 
“that independent groups were running election related advertisements while hiding 
behind dubious and misleading names”293   
However, even with empirical evidence reflecting that this practice is 
widespread, the Supreme Court refused to revisit their holding in Citizens United.   
V.  WHY THE COURT SHOULD HAVE REVISITED CITIZENS UNITED 
The Montana Court argued that because of Montana’s “unique” history and 
circumstances, the Montana Statute was distinguishable from the BCRA and, 
therefore, constitutional.  As noted above, the Supreme Court recently granted 
certiorari and summarily reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in Western 
Tradition Partnership294  This part provides additional arguments to strengthen the 
argument that Citizens United should have been limited or overturned.  These 
arguments include: the breadth of the First Amendment, the ability of PACs to speak 
for corporations, “foreign” corporations and the governmental power to regulate 
elections, shareholder protection, the treatment of public unions, and the Supreme 
Court’s history of altering constitutional doctrine when its understanding of the 
doctrine’s factual underpinnings are no longer accurate.   
                                                           
that it did not return the contribution until the Los Angeles Times raised questions about its 
propriety. 
 291 Mike Lillis, Supreme Court Empowers Foreign Governments to Sway Federal 
Elections?, WASH INDEP., Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://washingtonindependent.com/7460 
0/supreme-court-empowers-foreign-governments-to-sway-federal-elections.  
 292 Brian Montopoli, Chamber of Commerce Denies Foreign Money Funding Campaign 
Ads, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20018631-
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 293 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).  
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A.  Breadth of the First Amendment 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court discussed multiple cases where 
corporations are afforded First Amendment protection.295  The Court, citing to 
NAACP v. Button296 and Grosjean v. American Press Co.,297 held that First 
Amendment “protection has been extended [to corporations] by explicit holdings to 
the context of political speech.”298  The Court also cited Austin when stating that 
“[s]tate law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of 
assets.”299   
It is important to note that the Supreme Court, before Citizens United, never 
stated that corporations receive the same treatment under the First Amendment that 
individuals do.  In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com., the Supreme 
Court stated that “[t]he identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether 
speech is protected.  Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute 
to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas" that the 
First Amendment seeks to foster.’”300  In California Medical Association v. FEC, the 
Supreme Court held that “‘differing structures and purposes’ of corporations and 
unions ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of 
the electoral process.’”301  In FEC v. National Right to Work, the Supreme Court 
held that “‘the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly 
careful regulation’” in an electoral context.302  Throughout the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, the Court has strived to fashion a balance between the integrity of the 
electoral process and the freedom of speech provided by the First Amendment.   
The Supreme Court also relies heavily on Bellotti to show that restrictions 
distinguishing among different speakers, specifically allowing speech by some but 
not others, is not permitted and that “political speech does not lose First Amendment 
protection ‘simply because its source is a corporation.’”303  The Supreme Court’s 
discussion of Bellotti is somewhat misleading.  In Bellotti, the Court struck down a 
                                                           
 295 See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Town of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Time, Inc. 
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); 
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 
420 U.S. 469 (1975); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 
(1967); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 296 Nat’l Assoc. for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963). 
 297 Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). 
 298 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900. 
 299 Id. at 905 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
 300 Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub Utilities Co., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (citing First Nat’l 
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 301 Cal. Med. Ass’n. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981).  
 302 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982). 
 303 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784). 
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law that distinguished between a corporation whose business was materially affected 
by a referendum and one whose business was not.304   
It is important to note that Bellotti does not make any effort to distinguish 
expenditures by individuals and expenditures by corporations.  Interestingly, the 
Court in Citizens United specifically stated that the “Bellotti did not address the 
constitutionality of the State’s ban on corporate independent expenditures to support 
candidates.”305  It is also important to note that Bellotti involved expenditures on a 
referendum, not expenditures directed to a specific candidate.  The Court in Bellotti 
specifically stated that “‘[r]eferenda are held on issues, not candidates for public 
office.  The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections . . . 
simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue.’”306  This language suggests 
that the Supreme Court believed that corporate expenditures supporting or opposing 
a candidate could present a risk of corruption.   
The majority in Citizens United also goes to great lengths to emphasize that “the 
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate 
identity.”307  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, as noted by the dissent in Citizens 
United, reflects that the Court has regulated speech differently based upon a 
speaker’s identity.308  “It is clear that [neither] the right to associate nor the right to 
participate in political activities is absolute.”309 
In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, the Supreme Court held that “the 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings.”310  The Court specifically found that the 
“‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system’ 
disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others.  
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of 
expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”311   
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., the Supreme Court held 
that “[i]n a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights 
that are ‘inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological 
objectives of the corrections system.’”312  The Court further held that:  
                                                           
 304 Alexander Polikoff, So How Did We Get Into This Mess? Observations on the 
Legitimacy of Citizens United, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 203, 216 (2011).   
 305 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903. 
 306 Polikoff, supra note 304, at 215 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790).   
 307 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 308 Id. at 945 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (“The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights 
of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, and its own employees.”). 
 309 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) 
(quoting Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).  
 310 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).  
 311 Id. at 683.  “In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 . . . (1979), we echoed the 
essence of this statement of the objectives of public education as the ‘inculcate[ion of] 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.’”  Id. at 
681. 
 312 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977). 
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[i]n banning Union solicitation or organization, appellants have merely 
affected one of several ways in which inmates may voice their complaints 
to, and seek relief, from prison officials.  There exists an inmate grievance 
procedure through which correctional officials are informed about 
complaints concerning prison conditions, and through which remedial 
action may be secured.  With this presumably effective path available for 
the transmission of grievances, the fact that the Union's grievance 
procedures might be more “desirable” does not convert the prohibitory 
regulations into unconstitutional acts.313   
In Parker v. Levy, the Supreme Court held that “[w]hile the members of the 
military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the 
different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a 
different application of those protections.”314  The Court further held that “[s]peech 
that is protected in the civil population may nonetheless undermine the effectiveness 
of response to command.  If it does, it is constitutionally unprotected.”315   
The Supreme Court has also placed limits on the political speech of federal 
employees.  In Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court held 
that:  
The government has an interest in regulating the conduct and “the speech 
of its employees that differ[s] significantly from those it possesses in 
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.  The 
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”316  
The majority in Citizens United held that these decisions upheld a narrow class of 
speech restrictions operating to the disadvantage of certain persons because the 
“rulings were based on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their 
functions.”317  However, one could argue that a political system fraught with 
corruption or even the appearance of corruption would impede the government from 
allowing the democratic process to function the way it was intended.  The dissent 
made a strong argument that “Congress and half the state legislatures have 
concluded, over many decades, that their core functions of administering elections 
and passing legislation cannot operate effectively without some narrow restrictions 
on corporate electioneering paid for by general treasury funds.”318   
                                                           
 313 Id. at 131 n.6. 
 314 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).  
 315 Id. at 759. 
 316 Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973). 
 317 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010). 
 318 Id. at 946 (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting in part and 
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B.  PACs Can Speak for Companies 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that “[a] PAC is a separate 
association from the corporation . . . the PAC exemption from the [law’s] 
expenditure ban does not allow corporations to speak.”319  The Montana Court 
distinguished PACs in Montana, stating that unlike the federal rules for PACs, 
Montana law reflects that PACs can “be formed and maintained by filing simple and 
straight-forward forms or reports.”320   
This Article posits that PACs do have the ability to speak for corporations.  In 
FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., the Supreme Court held that PACs permit “some 
participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process by allowing 
them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of "separate segregated 
[funds]," which may be "utilized for political purposes."321  In FEC v. Beaumont, the 
Supreme Court held that PACs “allow[] corporate political participation without the 
temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with 
the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the government regulate 
campaign activity through registration and disclosure.”322  It is important to note that 
neither of these cases was overruled by Citizens United.323   
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence reflects a line of cases that found PACs to be 
a sufficient vehicle for corporate speech.  By ignoring their own jurisprudence, the 
Court in Citizens United stated that “[a] PAC is a separate association from the 
corporation.”324  It is instructive to look at the construction of a PAC and analyze this 
claim.  Federal election law refers to “a corporate or labor political committee as a 
‘separate segregated fund’ (SSF), though it is more commonly called a PAC.”325  
“As the name implies, money contributed to a [PAC] is held in a separate bank 
account from the general corporate or union treasury.”326  This structure seems to 
support the Court’s statements in Citizens United concerning the “separate” nature of 
PACs.   
However, a corporation or union that sponsors a PAC is called the connected 
organization.327  The connected organization may use its general treasury funds to 
pay for the costs of operating and raising money for the PAC.  These costs include: 
office space, phones, salaries, utilities, supplies, bank charges and fundraising 
                                                           
 319 Id. at 897.   
 320 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 20 (Mont. 2011).  
 321 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 201 (1982).   
 322 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003).   
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either of the decisions.   
 324 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897.   
 325 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION CAMPAIGN GUIDE: 
CORPORATIONS AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/ 
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activities.328  Contributions may be solicited from the corporation’s executive and 
administrative personnel and stockholders and also the families of these two 
groups.329  Stockholders include employees of the corporation who participate in an 
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), such as a 401(k).330  Because corporations 
are made up of and managed by individuals, and those same individuals have the 
ability to contribute to political campaigns through a corporation’s PAC, this is 
evidence that corporations do have the ability to speak through their respective 
PACs.   
C.  “Foreign” Corporations and Governmental Power to Regulate Elections 
The BCRA provides that it is unlawful for a foreign national to make a 
contribution or independent expenditure in a federal, state, or local election.331  A 
foreign national includes corporations and organizations formed under the laws of or 
having its principal place of business in a foreign country.332  In Citizens United, the 
Supreme Court specifically stated that they “need not reach the question whether the 
Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or 
associations from influencing our Nation's political process.”333  Because the 
Supreme Court did not rule on this issue many questions still exist such as how to 
treat corporations in the United States whose majority shareholders are foreign 
nationals and how to treat corporations that are incorporated in the United States, but 
have their principal place of business outside the United States. 
The seminal case discussing the First Amendment rights of foreign nationals in 
political elections is Bluman v. FEC.334  In Bluman, Canadian citizens, who were 
temporarily living and working in the U.S., argued to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia that the federal ban on their ability to contribute to U.S. 
political elections was unconstitutional.335  The court denied the plaintiffs’ claims 
and found that the government could exclude foreign citizens from activities that 
were part of democratic self-government in the United States and that the limitations 
on the activities of foreign citizens were part of the sovereign's obligation to preserve 
the basic conception of a political community.336 
The D.C. District Court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding that “[t]he 
government may exclude foreign citizens from activities ‘intimately related to the 
process of democratic self-government.’”337  The D.C. District Court further held 
that because foreign nationals are by definition outside of the U.S. political 
                                                           
 328 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(b) (2011).   
 329 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(1) (2011).   
 330 Id. 
 331 See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006).   
 332 31 C.F.R. § 800.216 (2011). 
 333 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).   
 334 See Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (2011).  
 335 See id. 
 336 Id. 
 337 Id. at 287 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984)). 
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community, they were not entitled to influence the political process.338  In regard to 
foreign corporations, the Court stated that foreign corporations are also barred from 
making contributions and expenditures in U.S political elections.339   
Based upon the discussion above, courts have clearly stated that the government 
has a compelling interest in excluding foreign corporations from participating in the 
U.S. political process.  This Article proposes that the Supreme Court should have 
revisited Citizens United in light of the empirical evidence showing foreign influence 
in U.S. politics and the rationale from Bluman and grant states the power to exclude 
all corporations that are not incorporated in that particular state or have their 
principal place of business in that state.  A “foreign” corporation in regard to a state 
is different than a “foreign” corporation in regard to the U.S. as a whole.  For 
example, the Texas Secretary of State website states that “[i]f an organization was 
formed under, and the internal affairs are governed by, the laws of a jurisdiction 
other than Texas, the organization is a “foreign entity.”340  The Vermont Secretary of 
State website states that “[a]n out-of-state ("foreign") corporation must procure a 
certificate of authority from our office in order to do business legally in Vermont.”341  
All states have the same or similar requirements and definitions.   
States should argue that they have the same concern as the U.S. in excluding 
foreign corporations from activities that are part of democratic self-government in 
their respective state.  A critical distinction that can be made is that while persons 
can be citizens of a state and the U.S. at the same time, corporations are artificial 
creations of the state.  The Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions that 
corporations are creatures of state law and that it is state law which grants corporate 
directors' powers.342  Based upon the current case law, states should argue that they 
have the same compelling interest preserving the basic conception of a political 
community in their respective state.   
The June 2012 Wisconsin Gubernatorial Recall Election is a good example of out 
of state corporations influencing state political elections.  According to an analysis 
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 339 Id. at 292 n.4. 
 340 Foreign or Out-of-State Entities, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE JOHN STEEN, http://www.sos.stat 
e.tx.us/corp/foreign_outofstate.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).    
 341 Corps. Div., Foreign Corporations, VT. SEC’Y OF STATE JIM CONDOS, 
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 342 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs, 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 
471, 478 (1979); see also Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A 
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of 
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define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares.”); United States v. Morton Salt, 
338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (“[Corporations] are endowed with public attributes.  They have a 
collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege to act as artificial 
entities.”). 
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by the Wisconsin Democracy Campaign,343 approximately 60 percent of the money 
raised by current Governor Scott Walker came from outside Wisconsin.344  Even 
though it is difficult to accurately track these numbers because of the lack of 
transparency from corporations concerning their donors, as an idea of the money 
flowing from out of state donors, Governor Walker raised $13 million dollars in the 
first three months of 2012 alone.345 
The Supreme Court has long held that states are permitted to regulate in-state 
components of interstate transactions so long as the regulation furthers legitimate in-
state interests.346  In Bigelow v. Virginia, Justice Rehnquist wrote in his dissenting 
opinion that the Supreme Court had “consistently recognized that irrespective of a 
State’s power to regulate extraterritorial commercial transactions in which its 
citizens participate it retains an independent power to regulate the business of 
commercial solicitation and advertising within its borders.”347   
The Supreme Court also has a long history of permitting the legislature, 
especially at the state and local levels, to regulate elections.  In Burroughs v. United 
States, the Supreme Court held that Congress possessed the power “to pass 
appropriate legislation to safeguard [the election of the President and Vice-President] 
from the improper use of money to influence the result . . . as it possesses every 
other power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general 
government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by 
corruption.”348  In United States v. Harriss, the Supreme Court held that Congress 
could legislate to obtain “information from those who for hire attempt to influence 
legislation or who collect or spend funds for that purpose” to determine “who is 
being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much.”349  In Ex Parte 
Yarbrough, the Supreme Court held that states “must have the power to protect the 
elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption.”350   
The Supreme Court has even stated that “the Framers of the Constitution 
intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the 
power to regulate elections,”351 and that “[s]tates [have] significant flexibility in 
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implementing their own voting systems.”352  The Supreme Court completely ignored 
not only the amount of empirical data reflecting the power of corporations and 
organizations to anonymously affect political processes, but also its own long history 
of granting states the ability to regulate state and local elections.   
D.  Shareholder Protection 
The Supreme Court also dismissed the shareholder protection argument raised in 
Citizens United.  The Court wrote that there was little evidence of abuse that could 
not be corrected by shareholders “‘through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.’”353  However, the Supreme Court does not provide any evidence to 
support this claim, they only make the assertion and then move to the next issue.  
Based upon the current state of securities laws, there is empirical evidence reflecting 
that shareholders do not hold the power proscribed to them by the Court in Citizens 
United.  
The first issue that arises is the transparency of political expenditures and 
contributions.  Corporate managers can spend corporate money on politics without 
notifying shareholders and do not need authorization from shareholders.354  An 
October 2010 study conducted by Sustainable Investments Institute (SSI) and the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRC) found that very few 
companies mention independent political expenditures in their stated policies.355 
The second issue is even if the shareholders are aware of a corporation’s political 
spending, they do not have the authority to stop the transaction.  Under corporate 
                                                           
 352 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34 
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law, shareholders must allege corruption or reckless conduct in order to even state a 
claim challenging management actions.356  This is not an easy burden to meet.357  
E.  Treatment of Public Unions 
It is instructive to look at Supreme Court decisions which have favored the First 
Amendment rights of public employees.  The Supreme Court has limited public 
unions with respect to political expenditures.  In International Association of 
Machinists v. Street, Justice Douglas wrote in his concurring opinion that the “use of 
union funds for political purposes subordinates the individual's First Amendment 
rights to the views of the majority.”358  In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the 
Supreme Court found that a public-sector union can bill nonmembers for chargeable 
expenses, but may not require them to fund its political projects.359  The Court 
specifically held that “a government may not require an individual to relinquish 
rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public 
employment.”360  In United States v. United Foods, the Supreme Court stated that 
“First Amendment values [would be] at serious risk if the government [could] 
compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies 
for speech on the side that [the government] favors.”361  It is important to note that 
the Supreme Court in Citizens United did not discuss these cases.   
In a recent post-Citizens United case, Knox v. SEIU, the Supreme Court 
specifically referenced Citizens United when it stated that even though public-sector 
unions have the right under the First Amendment to express their views on political 
and social issues, those employees who choose not to join a union have the same 
rights.362  These decisions show that the Justices granted First Amendment rights to 
some classes of employees, but not to others, which is in direct contravention of the 
spirit of the First Amendment and their own rationale used in Citizens United.   
F.  History of Altering Constitutional Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has a history of altering constitutional doctrine when its 
understanding of the doctrine’s factual underpinnings no longer appeared to be 
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accurate.  These cases have become some of the most important and powerful 
decisions throughout the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Based upon the empirical 
evidence reported in this Article alone, the Supreme Court should have reconsidered 
its holding in Citizens United.  
In State Board of Education v. Barnette, a group of students who were Jehovah's 
Witnesses refused to salute on the ground that the act of saluting the flag was a 
forbidden form of worship.363  The Supreme Court found that the state could not 
compel students to salute the American flag and recite the pledge of allegiance under 
penalty of expulsion because such compulsion exceeded constitutional limitations 
and invaded the sphere of intellect and spirit protected by the First Amendment.364  
This case overruled Minersville School District v. Gobitis, which held that a 
student’s constitutional rights were not violated by the school board's rule that they 
participate in a flag-salute ceremony as a condition of their attendance at public 
schools even though the students' refusal was based on their religious beliefs.365  In 
Barnette, the Supreme Court’s decision was partially based upon the Supreme 
Court’s inaccurate overestimation of government power to build national unity in 
Gobitis.366 
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v. 
Ferguson367 and the “separate but equal” doctrine, finding that it had no place in 
public education.368  The Court found that the segregation of white and African-
American children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the African-
American children.369  The Court went further and stated that “[w]hatever may have 
been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this 
finding is amply supported by modern authority” and that “[a]ny language in Plessy 
v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”370  In West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, the Supreme Court overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital371 and found 
that based upon recent economic experience, the denial of a living wage is not only 
detrimental to a person’s health and well being but also casts a direct burden for 
his/her support upon the community.372 
These cases all reflect that the Supreme Court has overruled previous decisions 
based upon changed circumstances or when understanding of the doctrine’s factual 
underpinnings no longer appeared to be accurate.  Even though the Citizens United 
decision was only two years ago, the campaign finance landscape has changed 
dramatically.  A 2010 study conducted by the Sunlight Foundation calculated the 
                                                           
 363 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).    
 364 Id. 
 365 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).   
 366 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.  
 367 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).   
 368 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 369 Id. at 494. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of the Dist. of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).  
 372 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
45Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
488 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:443 
 
effect of Citizens United on the 2010 midterm election and found that the decision 
was responsible for adding $126 million dollars in undisclosed spending by outside 
groups and $60 million dollars in disclosed spending by outside groups to the 
midterm election.373  According to the FEC, over $200 million dollars has been spent 
so far in the 2012 election cycle.374  According to a New York Times study, super 
PACs have spent over $113 million dollars in the 2012 election cycle.375  This 
empirical data and the empirical data of corruption listed earlier in this Article 
reflects that the Supreme Court’s statement that independent expenditures do not 
lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption has been found to be 
inaccurate and untenable. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided ample empirical evidence that there is virtually no 
actual difference between independent and coordinated expenditures and that 
independent expenditures can and do lead to corruption and the appearance of 
corruption.  It has presented empirical evidence of individuals creating shell 
corporations to conceal the source of political expenditures and also non-profit 
corporations being used to conceal the identities of those making political 
expenditures.   
The Supreme Court had a chance to revisit the Citizens United holding in light of 
this evidence, but refused to do so.  The Supreme Court should have reexamined its 
own holding, especially when there has been a significant change in factual 
conditions which renders its previous holding as “detrimental to the public 
interest.”376  This Article has certainly demonstrated this circumstance.   
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